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1 ABSTRACT 
The present paper describes part of a framework for the development of a risk assessment 
methodology to quantify the life safety risk for people present in buildings in the context of the 
creation of a fire safety design. Complex building designs and regulations drive engineers 
towards quantitative risk analysis (QRA). One of the key aspects in quantitative risk analysis 
is finding the proper balance between simplification of the scope by using different models and 
taking important case specific features into account. In other words, a proper balance needs to 
be found between modelling cost versus accuracy. Increasing the accuracy by means of 
sophisticated models will increase the computational cost or might force to reduce the amount 
of representative scenarios to be analysed. In this paper, a method is discussed which quantifies 
the safety level with regard to building configuration detailing. Attention is given to the 
accuracy of the deterministic models, and at the same time approaches are analysed which 
reduce the computational cost. The output for the quantification of the life safety level of the 
building is determined by means of a procedure in which several steps are taken to obtain the 
risk outcome. The final risk value is calculated with regard to a failure probability in analogy 
with structural engineering.  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
In prescriptive legislation regarding fire safety it is often implicitly assumed that if all the rules 
of the regulation are applied, the fire safety level is acceptable [1] [2] [3]. For a significant part 
of the buildings these prescriptive requirements are appropriate. However, architectural 
demands have become increasingly complex during the past decades as advances in structural 
engineering as well as material sciences have made it possible to realize buildings with 
complex configurations. These advances have outrun the prescriptive requirements in which 
complex geometries cannot be realized in accordance with the codes. Therefore, globally, more 
and more countries change their perspective codes and proceed to the design in function of 
objectives, such as an objective-based [2], a performance-based [1] [4] or a risk-informed [5] 
[6] format where the implicit acceptable safety level assumption in prescriptive rules now 
becomes explicit by showing the verified safety level. Although the aforementioned 
approaches still show some shortcomings [6], there is a consensus that a holistic approach is 
necessary in which the building configuration, user, content, safety systems and procedures are 
analysed together.  
 
Risk-based methods provide a way to evolve towards such a holistic approach. More 
specifically, quantitative risk assessment techniques provide an opportunity to determine the 
safety level in a representative measure. The advantage is that both the magnitude and 
likelihood of hazards versus safeguards can be determined [7]. In [8] a procedure is developed 
to determine the risk value by means of a full-probabilistic risk assessment. The risk indication 
is represented by means of a failure probability in which the failure state can be predefined 
depending on the boundary conditions set up by the stakeholders.  
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3 FRAMEWORK 
A procedure for quantifying the life risk is developed. A flowchart and guidance is proposed 
in which successive steps are described for analysis [8]. Four of the major steps in the flow 
chart are elaborated in this paper. The first step discusses the preceding sensitivity analysis to 
reduce the number of input variables.  The remaining variables are translated in discrete and 
continuous variables for the next part. The second step discusses the bow-tie structuring and 
important improvements incorporated in the bow-tie model in terms of reliability and efficacy. 
The third step deals with response surface modelling and reducing computational time for 
analysing complex multimodel tools. The results from the surrogate modelling are used for 
defining the failure limit stated design. This fourth step deals with the calculation of the failure 
probability in accordance to the limit state. In [8] more steps between the different models are 
discussed such as fault tree design, design of experiments, approximation of the failure domain, 
fire safety design, multimodel surrogate design, etc.). 
3.1 Preceding sensitivity analysis 
Generally, sensitivity analyses (SA) are performed to determine how uncertainty in the model 
output can be attributed to different sources of uncertainty in the model input [9]. The main 
objective of the preceding sensitivity analysis in fire safety risk assessment [10] & [11] is to 
reduce the dimensionality of the problem formulation. The larger the number of random 
variables, the higher the number of necessary solver evaluations. Considering the 
computational effort of several submodels, such as CFD and evacuation models, the 
dimensionality of several submodels needs to be reduced.  
 
Before discussing different techniques in sensitivity analysis it is good to distinguish between 
two types of SA [9], [12]: 
- Local sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine the local impact of parameters in 
the model. In this method are all derivatives taken at a single point. Usually, a local SA 
is only of practical importance when the variation around representative values of the 
input factors is small [13]. The main drawback of this approach is that interactions 
among factors cannot be detected, since they only become evident when the inputs are 
changed simultaneously. 
- In global sensitivity analysis, the emphasis is on linking the output uncertainty to the 
uncertainty of the input factors. Global measures offer a comprehensive approach to 
model interaction analysis, since they evaluate the effect of a factor while all others are 
varying as well, exploring efficiently all dimensions of the input space. Therefore, this 
type of SA is persuited. 
 
Figure 1: (Left) Responses for a 1D case with local and global effects and (Right) Representation of 
the balance between sensitivity analysis and computational efficiency. Taken from [14]. 
 
The choice of an appropriate sensitivity analysis technique depends on several factors [15] such 
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as the computational cost of running the model. Another important factor is the number of input 
variables. In Figure 1 (right), a graphical representation is given for choosing an appropriate 
type of sensitivity method, without going into depth about all the different types of sensitivity 
analysis. For a particular situation, one starts somewhere in the neighbourhood between 
screening design and automated differentiation. Automated differentiation is not suitable for 
numerical models such as CFD, because of the underlying complexity due to time and 
geometrical dependence. Fractional factorial design as used in [16] is a possible alternative. 
However, a high number of solver evaluations would be necessary to have an estimation of the 
interaction effects. Therefore, a screening designs is suggested. More specific, a radial design 
sampling technique as developed in [12] is suggested. The advantage of this technique is that 
the amount of necessary evaluations doesn’t grow exponentially with the number of input 
variables to be analysed. 
 
The radial design technique as investigated in [17]  is a sampling technique in which the 
sensitivity of the different parameters is analysed similar to Morris sampling [18]. The main 
difference of the technique is that the Morris techniques uses random trajectories and radial 
sampling uses random star structures. A two dimensional case is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Input 'star' plot with Sobol sampling for k = 2. 
 
The aim of the radial sampling is to calculate both the elementary effect and interaction effects 
between variables. In radial design each effect is computed over a different step size, equal to 
the distance between e.g. x(u)x(u) and x(v)x(u) which is equal to the difference between x(u) and 
x(v), where u and v denote two rows of the sampling matrix. Considering this notation, the 
absolute value of the elementary effect EEi can be calculated as [17]: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = �𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑢𝑢)𝑥𝑥∽𝑖𝑖(𝑢𝑢)) − 𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖(𝑉𝑉)𝑥𝑥∽𝑖𝑖(𝑢𝑢))
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
(𝑢𝑢) − 𝑥𝑥∽𝑖𝑖(𝑉𝑉) � 
 
Consequently, the measure μ* can be calculated as the average over r of these effects: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖
∗ = 1
𝑟𝑟
 ��𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑟𝑟
𝑗𝑗=1
 
 
The interaction effects can be calculated by means of the standard deviation: 
 
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
2 = 1
𝑟𝑟 − 1 ��𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝜇𝜇�2𝑟𝑟
𝑗𝑗=1
 
 
In which µ is the mean of the results.  
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3.2 Bow-tie methodology 
A bow-tie method is suggested for representing and analysing discrete parameters as pathway 
factors [20]. The extent of the bow-tie model can be reduced by limiting the pathway factors 
and only taking the discrete parameters into account and to take the influence of continuous 
variables into account in the response surface model (step 3). Continuous parameters are taken 
into account in the response surface mode.  
 
The bow-tie model is a combination of the fault and event tree analysis (FTA & ETA) with a 
critical event in the middle (Figure 3). FTA is a top down, deductive failure analysis in which 
an undesired state of a system is analysed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-
level events. ETA is a forward, bottom up, logical modelling technique for both success and 
failure that explores responses through a single initiating event and lays a path for assessing 
probabilities of the outcomes and overall system analysis [21]. The bow-tie technique requires 
formation of fault structures at the left side and branch scenarios at the right side of the critical 
event. In this regard, risk is analysed from an engineering point of view by multiplying 
frequency and consequences. Each branch scenario has its own frequency and consequences in 
terms of fatalities per year. By providing preventive safety measures in the FTA and mitigation 
safety measures in the ETA part, the negative effects from fire situations can be reduced. 
 
 
Figure 3:Making best use of model. Taken from [21] . 
 
It is important to include the effectiveness of safety systems. In engineering terms effectiveness 
can be defined as the product of reliability and efficacy [22]. Instead of only taking into account 
the probability of failure, the efficacy of the system should be integrated in the risk analysis. 
For example, a sprinkler system has a probability of activation and once activated it has a 
probability of containing or extinguishing the fire.  
3.3 Response surface modelling 
For every scenario branch to be analysed in the bow-tie structure, several non-fixed parameters 
are still variable and have to be taken into account. A method in order to deal with this aspect 
is developed by defining a response surface for every scenario and analysing the failure state 
(see part 3.4). 
 
The purpose of the response surface model is twofold. At the one hand, it will take into account 
the complexity and combine different submodels [23] such as fire spread, smoke spread, 
evacuation, etc. At the other hand, it will reduce the computational effort necessary to analyse 
the scenarios. The purpose of the surrogate model is to create a response surface with only a 
few solver evaluations. The creation of the response surface makes it possible to generate a 
complex interpolation function by which the output can be generated for a new combination of 
input data without evaluating a new sample [24]. This means a high number of input 
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combinations can be analysed without additional computational effort, which is of great 
importance when performing limit state analysis in order to evaluate probabilities and 
ultimately risks.  
 
The main objective of a response surface model is to approach the responses in the global 
domain for a certain model without understanding the physics of the system or when the 
modelling of the response becomes too complex. The response model can be formulated as: 
 
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑿𝑿) 
 
in which y is the response and X is the vector of input variables (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 4: Examples of a response surface model. Taken from [25] [14]. 
 
A response surface model (RSM) can be used for limit state design [26] when the problem 
statement is not explicitly formulated [14] and thus not differentiable which is the case for 
CFD-models. It can be used when the limit state function is implicitly formulated, which is the 
case for numerical models [24]. It is the  goal  of  a  RSM  to  replace  the output information 
of the complex model 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) by  an  equivalent  function 𝑓𝑓(̅𝑥𝑥)  by  which  the computational  
procedures  can  be  simplified.  An example of such function can be a polynomial function of 
the following type: 
  
𝑓𝑓̅(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑎𝑎 + �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
+ �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (1) 
 
in which xi, (i = 1,...,  n) are the basic variables and the parameters  a,  bi,  ci, (i =  1,…,  n)  
have  to  be  determined.  
 
The method for determining the model used for the current research is polynomial chaos 
expansion. Polynomial chaos expansions are a powerful surrogate modelling technique that 
aims at providing a functional approximation of a computational model through its spectral 
representation on a suitably built basis of polynomial functions. Without going into the 
fundamental mathematics, the polynomial chaos expansion of the model ℳ(𝑋𝑋) is defined as 
[27]: 
 𝑓𝑓(̅𝑥𝑥) =   ℳ(𝑿𝑿) =  � 𝑦𝑦𝛼𝛼Ψ𝛼𝛼(𝑿𝑿)
𝛼𝛼∈ΝΜ
 (2) 
 
where the 𝛹𝛹𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋) are multivariate polynomials orthonormal with respect to 𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋, 𝛼𝛼 ∈  𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 is a 
multi-index that identifies the components of the multivariate polynomials 𝛹𝛹𝛼𝛼 and the 𝑦𝑦𝛼𝛼 ∈  𝑅𝑅 
are the corresponding coefficients. 
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3.4 Limit state design 
In reliability based design one has to calculate the probability for the design to reach an 
undesired or unsafe state. Limit state design in fire safety engineering has been inspired by 
structural safety engineering because of the extensive experience with reliability analysis in 
this field. The general case of a limit state of a cross-section or construction element can be 
formulated in a limit state equation [28]:  
 
 g(𝐗𝐗) = 𝐙𝐙 = 𝐑𝐑− 𝐄𝐄 = 𝟎𝟎 (3) 
 
 
Where the vector Z consist of n basic variables. For all the different variable an appropriate 
probabilistic model has to be chosen. In case a basic variable has a negligible variation or 
uncertainty, the variable can be considered as deterministic. The function is defined so that 
g(X) > 0 corresponds to a safe condition, while g(X) < 0 corresponds to failure. For life safety 
analysis this unsafe state would be reached when untenable conditions occur in the considered 
compartment or building before egress has been completed. The definition of untenable 
conditions can be translated towards Fractional Effective Dose (FED) criteria [29]. In other 
words, the probability of reaching a specific FED value for one person or a group of persons 
can be analysed. 
 
 
Figure 5: Limit state design (Left) 1-D PDF and (Right) 2-D PDF. Taken from  [14][30] . 
 
An example of the failure region is shown in Figure 4 for a one and two dimensional case. The 
main purpose of the current step is to analyse the failure probability, defined above, by means 
of a level 2 or level 3 method [28]. In case the response surface can be formulated in closed 
form a level 2 method can be applied by means of the first order reliability method. In case no 
closed form can be derived, a level 3 method can be applied by means of methods such as 
Monte Carlo or importance sampling.  
 
4 CASE STUDY 
4.1 Problem description 
The main purpose of the case study is to investigate the feasibility, efficiency and validity of 
the discussed methodology. In the current contribution, an analysis is performed in order to 
validate the response surface method (part 3.3) in which different slice files of toxicity 
components are estimated based on the surrogate model. The case study consists of a multi-
purpose community assembly compartment. The fire scenario analysed is a fire on the stage 
area (red).  
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Figure 6: Case study multiple purpose assembly building. 
 
In the case study, the focus is put on the variability in the fire parameters. This means only one 
submodel, smoke and fire spread, is taken into account. This by means of a Computational 
Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model, more specifically the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS 6) tool . 
From a preceding sensitivity analysis, it is decided to take three important parameters into 
account: the fire growth rate, the Heat Release Rate per Unit Area (HRRPUA) and the maximal 
area of the fire. In the table below the distributions for these parameters are described. 
 
  Type μ_log σ_log Analysed range Units 
α-growth Var 1 Lognormal -6.6 2.2 0.01 – 0.14  kW/s2 
HRRPUA Var 2 Lognormal 5.97 0.198 250 - 800 kW/m2 
Max area Var 3 Lognormal 0.78 1.7 2.0 – 71.0 m2 
Table 1: Input parameters case study. 
 
Several methods have been investigated for the choice of the samples based on design of 
experiments. In this case study, the input samples are chosen based on Sobol [31] indices and 
the input range is chosen based on the domain of expected failure state of the probability density 
distributions. For academical purpose, 64 simulations are performed over a wide spectrum of 
the input range (see Table 1). 
   
Figure 7: Design of Experiments input samples. 
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Apart from the 64 support points, 20 validation samples are evaluated. The validation samples 
are chosen between the ranges ranges shown in Table 1, this in order to have an interpolation 
approach. 
4.2 Results 
In the figure below, the results are presented for a validation case different time steps for α = 
0.0122, HRRPUA = 296 kW/m2 and Amax = 5.17 m2 and compared with the results of the RSM. 
The figures show a good agreement between the estimated values based on the developed 
response surface and the validation set.  
 
Estimated set based on RSM Validation set 
  
t = 120 s, equipotential [CO] = 120 ppm 
  
t = 240 s ,equipotential [CO] = 690 ppm 
  
t = 300 s, equipotential [CO] = 1190 ppm 
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t = 360 s, equipotential [CO] = 1850 ppm 
  
t = 480 s, equipotential [CO] = 3230 ppm 
Figure 8: Estimated and validation set for the response surface model based on PCE. 
 
The average error in % is calculated between the estimated set and validation set over the entire 
xy-plane. This for every time step separately by means of: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 =  1# 𝑛𝑛�� [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶]𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  −  [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶]𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛  [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶]𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛  𝑦𝑦
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑥𝑥
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
In the figure below, the average error in % is shown for the discussed simulation with 60 time 
steps (480 s). The results show that the average error is between -2.5 % and 2 % which is 
assumed to be a good agreement considering the highly turbulent flow in the compartment. It 
is expected to have better results in more stable conditions. The zero values fort he initial values 
are because of two reasons: no concentrations are measured in the beginning, and errors on 
concentrations below 100 ppm were not taken into account because of insignificance compared 
to the major part of the other results. 
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Figure 9: Average error for the validation simulation. 
 
In total 20 validation simulations were performed for the validation of the model. All of these 
simulations showed good agreement and small error compared to the validation set. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In this paper a procedure is developed for performing a full-probabilistic risk analysis to 
determine life safety risk in buildings in case of fire. The focus is put on the probabilistic part 
of the methodology. Several important steps are explained to determine the final risk value. 
The integrated approach involves several submodels for dealing with complex designs. The 
models can take into account all types of geometry and materials, human behaviour and 
different susceptibilities of people for smoke. 
 
In the case study, the applicability of the PCE response surface model is investigated by 
performing a validation. The results show that approximation of the effluents of the fire is 
possible by means of proper surrogate modelling. Hence, the proposed approach indeed 
provides a possible alternative to reduce to reduce the computational efforts when analysing 
the life safety risk in fire safety calculations.  
 
6 FUTURE PERSPECTIVE 
In the ongoing research, the method will be tested with multiple interconnected submodels such 
as evacuation, fire spread, consequence models, etc. Secondly, the dynamic bow-tie structure 
will be developed. 
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